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between	 spouses	 in	 a	 household	 context.	 In	 the	 process,	 the	 restrictions	 implied	
by	 Beckerian-caring	 preferences	 in	 the	 Chiappori	 (2002)	 Collective	 model	 are	
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substantially	more	complex	when	 that	person	 is	placed	within	a	household	context.	
For	example,	couples	may	adjust	their	hours	of	employment	to	offset	changes	in	their	





in	 the	 labour	 supply	 literature	 with	 the	 works	 of	 Chiappori	 (1988,	 1992).	 	 In	 the	
Collective	framework,	the	household	is	an	environment	where	the	respective	spouses	





perceived	unemployment	 risks	 and	 the	 relative	power	 between	 the	members	 of	 the	
couple	 in	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 household.	 This	 is	 achieved	 by	 first	 introducing	 job	
















Following	Chiappori	et al.,	(2002),	let	h i	and	C i,	for	i=1,2	denote	member	i’s	
labour	supply	(where	0	≤	h i ≤	1)	and	consumption	of	a	private	Hicksian	composite	good	
whose	price	is	set	equal	to	1.	In	addition,	x	denotes	a	K-vector	of	preference	factors	
such	 as	 age,	 gender,	 and	 education	 of	 the	 two	 agents.	Also,	 let	w1,	w2,	 y	 represent	
the	members’	wage	rates	and	the	household	non-labour	 income.	Finally,	 let	s	be	an	
L-dimension	 vector	 of	 distribution	 factors.	 Distribution	 factors	 affect	 the	 decision	
process	but	don’t	impact	on	the	preferences	or	the	budget	constraint;	for	example,	in	
our	case	exogenous	changes	in	individual	job	insecurity.		
In	 the	most	 general	 framework	member	 i’s	 preferences	 are	 represented	 by	
some	utility	 function	of	 the	form	U i	(l	–	h1,	C1,	 l	–	h2,	C2,	x)	and	 the	household	 is	
assumed	to	maximize	a	General	Household	Welfare	Function	(GHWF)	that	can	be	
explicitly	 written	 as	HC=	µU1 +	 (l	 –	µ)U2.	 Formally,	 given	 (w1w2y,s,x)	 there	 exists	
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egoistic,	U i	(l	–	h i,	C i,	x)	for	i=1,2;	or	caring	in	a	Beckerian	sense,	u i =	Fi[U i (l	–	h i,	
C i,	x)	U j (l	–	h j,	C j,	x)]	with	i=1,2	and	i	=/	 j.	Note	that	in	the	Beckerian	case	household	
members	care	about	each	other’s	preferences	as	well	their	own.	
Both	 types	 of	 preferences	 are	 discussed	 in	 Chiappori	 et al.,	 (2002).	 The	
Beckerian	 Caring	 Preferences	 impose	 an	 additional	 restriction	 on	 the	 household	
members’	 labour	supply	functions	 (see	equation	(9)).	The	egoistic	assumption	plays	
a	key	role	in	the	formulation	of	the	maximization	problem.	Chiappori	(1992)	proved	
that	whenever	 individual	 utilities	 are	of	 the	 form	U i	 (l	 –	h i,	C i,	x),	 then	 (1)	 can	be	
reformulated	as	in	Proposition	1,	as	a	direct	consequence	of	the	Second	Fundamental	
Welfare	Theorem.	
Proposition 1 – Whenever individual preferences are egoistic, then, there 
exists some function ϕ(w1w2 y,s,x) such that (h1,h2,C1,C2) is the solution to the program: 
max						U i(l	–	hi,C i,	x)																																																																																																																																																																							(2)
subject to
w ih i	+	φi ≥	C i	,
0	≤	h i	≤	l,
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household	to	variations	in	w1,	w2,	y	and	s.	The	labour	supply	functions	are	assumed	to	
be	continuously	differentiable	and	can	be	written	as:	
h1 =	H1	(w1, ϕ(w1,w2 ,y,s,x),x);																																																																																								(3)
h2 =	H2	(w2, y	–	φ(w1,w2 ,y,s,x),x);																																																																																		(4)




only	up	to	an	additive	constant	k(x).	This	implies	Σi   ϕ̂ i ≈	y,	the	sum	of	the	two	estimated	non-labour	income	shares	is	approximately	equal	to	total	non-labour	income,	and	will	
differ	 by	 the	 additive	 constant	k(x)	which	depends	on	 the	household	heterogeneity	
and	cannot	be	empirically	identified.	The	structure	of	the	two	labour	supply	functions	
makes	 it	 possible	 to	 impose	 testable	 restrictions	 on	 labour	 supply	 behaviour	 and	
recover	 the	 partial	 derivatives	 of	 the	 sharing	 rule	 (see	Chiappori	 et al.,	 (2002)	 for	
further	detail,	especially	Proposition	2).		
We	 explore	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	 within	 the	 household	 by	 assuming	
that	this	distribution	can	be	fully	captured	by	how	income	is	allocated	between	the	
spouses.	Browning	and	Gørtz	(2012)	argue	that	the	concept	of	power	is	defined	not	





for	 leisure	 and	 consumption	within	 the	 household.	Wages	 or	 productivity	 in	 home	
production	may	also	vary	across	the	spouses,	and	that	may	lead	to	differences	in	the	
leisure	 taken.	Ultimately,	 there	may	be	 an	uneven	distribution	 of	 power	within	 the	






2.1 Labour supplies: Functional form and parametric specification 
Before	 proceeding	 with	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 Collective	 model,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
specify	 the	 functional	 form	 of	 the	 spouses’	 labour	 supply	 functions.	 	 In	 this	work	
the	 two	 distribution	 factors,	 namely,	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 s	 vector	 that	 appears	 in	
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and)	meet	 the	collective	restrictions,	 then	the	sharing	rule	can	be	derived	up	to	 the	
additive	constant	k(x),	and	for	a	given	k(x)	the	individual	indirect	utility	functions	can	
be	recovered.	This	specification	can	also	be	readily	extended	to	allow	for	interactions	
between	 distribution	 factors	 and	 preferences	 factors.	 The	 generalized	 log-system	
constitutes	a	good	basis	if	one	wanted	to	make	the	whole	system	more	flexible	by,	for	
example,	introducing	higher	order	polynomial	in	log	w1,	log	w2	and	y.	The	log	form	for	
wages	allows	the	effect	of	wi	on	h i  to	decrease	as	h i	increases.
2.2 Sharing rule 









upward	sloping	or	backward	bending	everywhere.	Empirical	evidence,	however,	 shows	 that	 the	
sign	of	the	slope	may	change	with	the	level	of	the	wages.	This	is	especially	true	in	a	household	
contest	(i.e.	in	a	two-individual	economy	where	the	two	subjects	strictly	interact).	What	happens	
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HILDA	 collects	 information	 on	 a	 range	 of	 topics	 including	 economic	 and	
subjective	 well-being,	 labour	 market	 dynamics	 and	 family	 dynamics.	 A	 potential	
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3.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The	Collective	models	 are	 a	 class	 of	 generally	non-nested	models:	 each	Collective	







model.	 The	 first	 wave	 of	 data	 is	 excluded	 due	 to	 lack	 information	 on	 pertinent	
















and	 retail	 services	 sectors	whilst	men	 are	more	 typically	 found	 in	manufacturing,	
public	administration	and	construction.				
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Table 1 - Selected individual and household characteristics   
 
 Men Women
Individual Variables Mean Sd Mean Sd
Age	 40.34	 8.86	 38.37	 8.69
Hours	of	Work	 44.66	 9.51	 32.58	 12.31
Desired	Hours	of	Work	 41.35	 8.68	 30.30	 10.30
Ave	Hourly	Wage		 26.87	 12.02	 22.48	 9.84
Log	Ave	Hourly	Wage	Rate	 3.20	 0.41	 3.03	 0.39
Expected	Job	Insecurity	 8.96	 18.69	 7.68	 17.70
Overall	Market	Insecurity	 10.34	 3.08	 9.33	 2.92
Future	Employment	Worry	 0.15	 0.35	 0.13	 0.34
Schooling	(Years	of)	 13.08	 2.85	 13.20	 2.62
Household	Variables	 	 Mean	 Sd	
Household	Size	 	 3.34	 1.17	
Total	Dependent	Children	 	 0.83	 0.99	
Household	Non-labour	Income	 	 	7705.69	 27609.76	
Regions	 	 Freq	 Percent
New	South	Wales	 	 1891	 28.6
Victoria	 	 1701	 25.7
Queensland	 	 1486	 22.5
South	Australia	 	 573	 8.7
Western	Australia	 	 477	 7.2
Tasmania	 	 208	 3.1
Northern	Territory	 	 64	 1.0
Australian	Capital	Territory	 	 213	 3.2	
Section	of	State	
Major	Urban	 	 4178	 63.2	
Other	Urban	 	 1598	 24.2	
Rural	 	 837	 12.7
Employment	Contract	 Freq	 Percent	 Freq	 Percent
Employed	on	a	Permanent	basis	 5592	 84.6	 4807	 72.7
Employment	on	a	Casual	Basis	 415	 6.3	 1130	 17.1
Other	(e.g.	Fixed-term	Contract)	 606	 9.2	 676	 10.2
Occupation	 	 		 		 	
Managers	 1123	 17.0	 516	 7.8
Professionals	 1645	 24.9	 2282	 34.5
Technicians	and	Trades	 1239	 18.7	 231	 3.5
Community-Personal	Service	 501	 7.6	 917	 13.9
Clerical-Administrative	 673	 10.2	 1654	 25.0
Sales	 327	 4.9	 535	 8.1
Machinery	Operators	and	Drivers	 672	 10.2	 55	 0.8
Labourers	 430	 6.5	 421	 6.4
Industry	 	 		 		 	
Agriculture-Fishing-Forestry	 132	 2.0	 66	 1.0
Mining	 205	 3.1	 30	 0.5
Manufacturing	 996	 15.1	 297	 4.5
Electricity-Gas	Supply	 150	 2.3	 20	 0.3
Construction	 533	 8.1	 84	 1.3
Wholesale	Trade	 300	 4.5	 150	 2.3
Retail	Trade	 382	 5.8	 632	 9.6
Accommodation-Restaurants	 166	 2.5	 296	 4.5
Transport	 465	 7.0	 122	 1.8
Communication	 201	 3.0	 187	 2.8
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The	 measure	 of	 overall	 market	 job	 insecurity	 makes	 some	 allowance	 for	
gender	based	employment	differences	in	occupation	and	industries;	it	is	constructed	
by	 taking	 the	 average	 of	 the	 individuals’	 “expected	 job	 insecurity”	 variable	 across	







On	 average	 the	 households	 have	 slighter	 less	 than	 one	 dependent	 child	 (a	
resident	child	aged	under	15),	with	total	household	size	averaging	3.34	people	suggesting	





4. Estimation  
As	discussed	above,	the	sharing	rule	plays	a	crucial	role	in	Collective	Labour	Supply	
models.	 This	 rule	 is	 recovered	 if	 the	 Collective	 restrictions	 (either	 (8)	 or	 (9))	 are	
satisfied.	In	the	following,	individual	utilities	are	modelled	as	caring	in	a	Beckerian	
sense	and	equations	(5)	and	(6)	are	estimated	subject	 to	 the	restrictions	reported	 in	
equation	 (9).	 The	 non-linear	 constraints,	 as	 specified	 in	 equation	 (9),	 can	 be	 dealt	




to	 relevant	 taxable	 income	 after	 deductions.	The	 components	which	 the	Australian	Tax	Office	





Table 1 - Selected individual and household characteristics (continued)
 Men Women
	 Freq	 Percent	 Freq	 Percent
Finance	 259	 3.9	 351	 5.3
Rental-Hiring-Real	Estate	 80	 1.2	 82	 1.2
Profess	Scientific	Technical	 398	 6.0	 432	 6.5
Administrative-Support	 80	 1.2	 168	 2.5
Public	Administration	 938	 14.2	 491	 7.4
Education-Training	 613	 9.3	 1387	 21.0
Health	Care	 342	 5.2	 1572	 23.8
Recreation	Services	 110	 1.7	 77	 1.2
Other	 263	 4.0	 169	 2.6
Source:	HILDA	Dataset	–	Pooled	Sample	(Wave	2	to	Wave	9).
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where	γ1	and	γ2	as	given	by	(10)	are	estimated	 in	place	of	β4	and	β5.	Equations	 (11)	and	 (12)	 are	 estimated	 simultaneously	 and	 the	 restrictions	 are	 imposed	 directly	 in	
the	 estimation	 process.	 The	 (asymptotic)	 standard	 errors	 se(γ̂1)	 and	 se(γ̂2)	 needed	for	 constructing	 confidence	 intervals,	 conducting	 tests	 and	 making	 inference	 are	
computed	using	the	Delta	Method.	
The	two	labour	supply	functions	are	estimated	using	the	Generalized	Method	
of	 Moments	 (GMM).	 This	 approach	 is	 preferred	 since	 it	 is	 able	 to	 consistently	
estimate	 the	standard	errors	even	 in	 the	presence	of	heteroskedasticity	of	unknown	
form	(unlike	Maximum	Likelihood).	The	GMM	estimator	exploits	the	assumption	that	
the	 instruments	are	exogenous,	and	 the	estimator	 is	 robust	 to	heteroskedasticity	 (of	
unknown	form)	and	allows	for	possible	correlation	between		ε1	and	ε2.	
5. Results 
Selected	 results	 for	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 labour	 supply	 functions	 are	 presented	 in	
Table	2.	The	models	are	well	defined	and	the	coefficients	are	consistent	with	the	priors	
discussed	 above.	 If	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 paper	was	 on	 labour	 supply,	we	would	 go	 on	
to	present	 relevant	elasticities	and	discuss	 the	 results	more	 fulsomely.	However,	 for	
our	purposes,	the	emphasis	is	on	the	parameter	estimates	as	a	means	to	calculate	the	
sharing	rule.		







the	 Collective	model	with	 Caring	which	 is	 represented	 as	 a	 system	 of	 non-linear	
equations	and	estimated	with	non-linear	GMM.	Columns	3	and	4	of	Table	2	report	
the	parameter	 estimates	of	 (11)	 and	 (12).	The	final	 column	 (column	5)	 reports	 the	
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Table 2 - Parameter estimates
 Unrestricted model Constrained model
     Sharing Rule
 Wife Husband Wife Husband with Caring
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)
log	wf	 -0.874**	 -1.129***	 -1.076***	 -0.909***	 5400.741**	 (0.444)	 (0.401)	 (0.388)	 (0.260)	 (2474.172)
log	wm	 -0.961**	 -1.128***	 -1.145***	 -0.905***	 5325.301**	 (0.403)	 (0.408)	 (0.350)	 (0.267)	 (2396.712)
log	wf	×	log	wm	 0.299**	 0.350***	 0.360***	 0.282***	 -1674.494**	 (0.133)	 (0.125)	 (0.116)	 (0.081)	 (766.352)
Nonlabour	income	 -0.0002**	 0.00003	 -0.0002**	 0.00001	 0.955***
	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.311)
Distribution Factors	 		 		 		 		 	
Expected	Job	Insecurity	 -0.0002**	 -0.0001*	 -0.0002**	 -0.0002**	 0.942*
	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.0001)	 (0.544)
Future	Employment	Worry	 -0.025***	 -0.019***	 -0.025***	 -0.020***	 116.294**
	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (51.694)












As	 shown	 in	 Table	 2,	 the	 set	 of	 instruments	 passes	 the	 over-identifying	
restrictions	 test.	 An	 additional	 test	 was	 conducted	 to	 check	 for	 the	 weakness	 of	
instruments.	As	explained	in	Stock	and	Yogo	(2001)	and	Stock	et al.,	(2002),	this	test	
involves	 the	 construction	 of	what	 they	 call	 the	 concentration	 parameter.	Given	 the	
different	set	of	instruments	used	for	the	two	labour	supply	equations,	the	concentration	
parameter	was	computed	for	the	two	labour	supplies.	Their	closeness	to	the	critical	
values	 provided	 in	 Stock	 and	 Yogo	 (2001)	 support	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 chosen	
instruments	and	their	strength.	Moreover,	given	the	weighting	matrix	used	in	equation	
7	The	 dataset	 provides	 information	on	 gross	weekly	wage	 and	weekly	 hours	 of	work.	Average	
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The	 dependent	 variable	 and	 non-labour	 income	 are	 rescaled	 (they	 were	






























variables	on	 the	sharing	 rule.	Here	 the	 interpretation	 is	carried	out	 from	the	wife’s	
perspective,	 but	 the	 same	 interpretation	 can	 be	 conducted	 from	 the	 husbands’	
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